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Abstract
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) contribute immensely to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and they have a significant influence in growth of economy. However,
SMEs are constrained in their access to formal credit as financial institutions fail to
grant credit due to information asymmetry. This study investigates the credit
rationing of SMEs in the city of Chittagong. A sample of 200 firms was selected and
analyzed using descriptive statistics and multinomial logit regression. The result
suggests that 89 % of the firms obtained loan from microfinance institutions (MFIs).
The firms that obtained their loan from banks are 60 % and 48 % of them received
the less amount of credit than they desired. In our study, credit rationing was
categorized in four types, 24 % of them were unconstrained non-borrowers, 28 %
unconstrained borrowers, 19 % quantity rationed and 29 % risk rationed borrowers.
Econometrics result shows that education, firm age, marital status, initial outlay, number
of employees, and education do not have any impact on credit rationing. On the
contrary, age and gender of the owners of the firms, heads of household, status of the
living and work place and household size have impact on credit rationing.
Keywords: Credit rationing, Small and medium enterprises, Entrepreneur, Financial
institutions, Chittagong, Bangladesh
Background
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are a fundamental part of the economic struc-
ture in developing countries as they play a vital role in furthering growth, innovation
and prosperity (Dalberg 2011). As a developing country, the role of SMEs is crucial for
overall economic development in Bangladesh. To promote economic development and
growth, Bangladesh government has emphasized the rapid growth of SMEs. The mo-
tivation behind this weight is that SMEs have a significant role in employment gener-
ation, poverty reduction, and overall economic growth, especially for a developing
economy like Bangladesh (Akterujjaman 2010). In the process of SME sector develop-
ment, financing is an important topic for research and an issue of great importance to
the policymakers. Nowadays, credit programs for financing have been given due atten-
tion by donors and governments (Bigsten et al. 2003). This is due to the fact that credit
markets are not functioning well in many developing countries. SMEs in developing
countries have limited access to formal financial services due to the lack of collateral
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and relatively high transaction cost for small loans (Doan et al. 2010). Yet, the majority
of SMEs in developing countries are considered unworthy by formal Financial Institu-
tions (FIs). Moreover, SMEs are strongly restricted in accessing the capital that they re-
quire for growth and expansion. Evidence shows that nearly half of SMEs in developing
countries’ access to finance is a major problem (Dalberg 2011). Therefore, improving
the availability of credit facility is the key to the development of SMEs in developing
countries and thereby realizing the potential contribution to the economy.
In particular, SMEs provide the necessary foundations for sustained growth and rising
income in the less developed and transitional economies. A World Bank survey (2002)
on the development of SMEs in Bangladesh reports that lack of finance is the crucial
issue. In addition, Report on Contribution of Banks on SME Sector in Bangladesh as-
serts that SMEs have always been short of business support and regulatory and finan-
cial assistance. Mahmud (2006) found that SMEs of Bangladesh have very limited bank
finance, which is only around 10 %, while self-finance remains the major source of their
finance contributing 76.5 % of fixed capital and 51.8 % of working capital. In most of
the cases, businesses started using own savings and borrowing from friends and rela-
tives while banking source come after that. For SMEs, to build up fixed and working
capital from banks is difficult since banks are not so willing to provide a loan of small
size for the higher cost. Generally, the commercial banks provide credit only to the well
established and large scale trading and manufacturing customers because it is easy to
handle and convenient to support them. In spite of these difficulties, currently SME
sector contributes about 25 % to GDP in Bangladesh economy (Ministry of Finance
(MoF) 2012). Experts suggest that this rate has to be enhanced to at least 50 % for
helping Bangladesh economy to achieve a sustainable mid-income country status.1 Evi-
dence also shows that one of the main reasons for the SMEs modest contribution to
GDP and slow growth and development in Bangladesh is their credit constraints2 (The
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and US 2003).
Bangladesh government has taken various initiatives to develop SMEs in Bangladesh
and to solve their financing problems. An SME cell was created in 2003 in the Ministry
of Industries. The SME Foundation (SMEF), established in 2007, is an independent
body for looking after the SME sectors in Bangladesh. In addition, various government
organizations including specialized banks are engaged in providing credit to the SME
sector. A specialized bank named BASIC Bank Limited (Bangladesh Small Industries
and Commerce Bank Limited) was established in 1988 with the foremost objective of
financing the small and cottage industries. Furthermore, Central Bank of Bangladesh
has taken a good number of initiatives to promote SMEs lending and is committed to
facilitating SMEs credit through refinancing window for real entrepreneurs who are dir-
ectly involved in the SME sector. Parvin et al. (2012) found that the share of SMEs in
total loan is lower in Bangladesh. Therefore, inadequate funding still remains a con-
straint for SMEs to grow in Bangladesh.
Credit constraint by formal financial institutions stifles the growth of SMEs. To fill
the gap, in some developing countries, informal financial institutions have become suc-
cessful in meeting the credit demand by SMEs. However, due to their limited resources
they are restricted from effectively satisfying the credit needs of SMEs (Atieno 2001).
SMEs are increasing in number and size, and the loan they demand has become beyond
the capacity of informal financial institutions. Despite financing being a major factor
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for potential growth of SMEs, several reports by researchers and consultants have
showed that SMEs face credit constraints. During credit constraints, SMEs may not be
able to invest, despite their willingness to invest unless they have an available internal
source of finance. Hoassain (1998)) has reported in his research that the most critical
constraint of small and medium scale manufacturers in Bangladesh is the lack of suffi-
cient capital to operate the business. As a result, the economy lose some of the poten-
tial benefits of promising projects and the constraint of credits and credit constrained
firms cannot contribute to employment generation and poverty alleviation. Therefore,
understanding the factors that are responsible for credit constrains of SMEs is import-
ant. Thus, this study will identify the determinants of credit constraints and will suggest
policy issues that might help to minimize the credit constraints of SMEs.
Research objective and questions
The objective of the study is to help minimize the credit constraints of SMEs by inves-
tigating the determinants of credit rationing. Therefore, General Research Question
(GRQ) to achieve the objective is: How do we investigate the determinants of credit ra-
tioning of SMEs? In doing so, it is also aimed at investigating the characteristics of
SMEs and SME owners, the major source of credit for SMEs and identifying policy is-
sues to enhance access to credit by SMEs. To achieve the above objectives, the study
has answered the following Specific Research Questions (SRQ); SRQ1: What are the
characteristics of SMEs in the study area? SRQ2: What are the major sources of credit
for SMEs? SRQ3: What factors influence credit rationing of SMEs? SRQ4: What issues
help to minimize the credit constraints and formulate effective credit policy of SMEs?
SMEs in both developed and developing countries greatly contribute to the creation
of employment opportunities, and income generation. They are also known as sources
of livelihood and as means of fighting poverty. SMEs have been treated as having higher
potential for GDP growth to Bangladesh economy as well. However in most developing
countries including Bangladesh SMEs have been facing problems of accessing credit
due to limitations of credit market. The limitations in the credit market and the prob-
lem of asymmetric information have been leading to credit constraint also. Therefore,
this study will try to investigate the major determinants of credit constraints that exist
and are relevant to SMEs located in the business hub of Bangladesh (Chittagong). The
findings from this study will feed into the policy arena in terms of improving access to
formal credit markets and realization of the goals for the central bank of Bangladesh.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section one includes introduction, state-
ment of the problem, objectives, research questions and significance of the study. The
second section deals with the theoretical framework with the review of relevant litera-
ture of the study. Section three discusses data and methods including study area. Sec-
tion four covers the results and discussion and the final section (five) includes a
conclusion.
Theory
SME and Special Programs Department of Bangladesh Bank defines Small and Medium
Enterprise as the business firm of service, business and industrial sector which is not a
public limited company and rationed with its fixed assets other than land and building
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(not above BDT3 200 million) and has limited employed manpower (not above 150).
For the development of SME sectors, access to finance is vital. As SME entrepreneurs
raise complain in many cases for the high rate of interest, Bangladesh Bank is commit-
ted to ease SME finance. SME finance is the funding of enterprises which represents a
key function of the business finance market. The major functions of this market are
supplying, acquiring and pricing of capital for SMEs. Generally, the business finance
market supplies capital in the form of loan, credit and asset-based financing; say, factor-
ing or invoice discounting and an enterprise can borrow fund in the form of bank loans
from formal and informal financial institutions (FIs) to operate its business. A business
finance market or credit market can be imperfect for asymmetric information that leads
to credit rationing of a business. Asymmetric information makes credit market costly
and difficult for banks to obtain correct information of borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981). In Bangladesh, we may classify the credit market into two ways, like rural and
urban. A sizable part of the rural credit market is informal involving lending generally
at the short term that includes traditional non-institutional ways of accumulating and
extending capital. The major sources of informal lending are friends, relatives and kin
members, landlords, neighbors, shopkeepers, marketing intermediaries, money lenders
and other local income groups.
The term credit market is used to describe the place where investors with surplus
capital provide their surplus capital to those who are in need of capital. This may be
done directly, such as a person borrowing from a friend or relative or financial inter-
mediaries such as banks, mutual funds, insurance companies may facilitate this process.
The urban credit market has two components: money market, and capital market. Evi-
dence shows that for the SME financing, money market or short-term financing is
more appropriate. The main sources of short-term financing in Bangladesh are trade
credit; bank credit; loans from NGOs; accruals; commercial paper and factoring. But all
SMEs don’t have access to credit market for various constraints. An SME is credit con-
strained or rationed if its terms of access to the credit market imply that it is unable or
unwilling to exploit some socially profitable investment.
Credit rationing may be investigated at two stages: the first stage is loan quantity ra-
tioning and the second stage is loan size rationing. In the first stage, credit is granted
to a group or an individual who is selected as creditworthy borrower while others are
rejected as unworthy borrowers. In the second stage, borrowers get a smaller amount
of loan than they desire (Baydas et al. 1994). Boucher et al. (2009) found five categories
of borrowers in credit market: a) unconstrained borrowers or price rationed borrowers,
b) unconstrained non-borrowers or price rationed non-borrowers, c) quantity rationed
borrowers, d) risk rationed borrowers, and e) transaction cost rationed borrowers
Table 1. In nature, unconstrained borrowers are not affected with credit limit by FIs. On
the other hand, unconstrained non-borrowers are not interested in FIs loan although
they are not affected by the credit limit. Again, the following three types of rationed bor-
rower: quantity, risk, and transactional cost are non-price rationed borrowers (Boucher
et al. 2009). The borrowers who apply to FIs for a loan but obtain either lower amount
of loan than they desire or rejected are quantity rationed borrowers. Finally, the bor-
rowers who voluntarily withdraw themselves from the credit market due to the risk as-
sociated with collateral and high transaction cost of the loan are risk and transaction
cost rationed borrowers. If an SME faces any of these three aforesaid forms of non-price
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rationed is considered as credit constrained borrower. Mostly, If SMEs are able to pro-
vide collateral; FIs allow credit even if uncertainty involves the firms in the credit
arrangement.
The model DEM proposed by Boucher et al. (2009)) to classify subjects according to
their status in credit market. In our case, we have used the DEM and distinguish four
categories4 of borrowers; price rationed borrowers (unconstrained borrowers), price ra-
tioned non-borrowers (unconstrained non-borrowers), quantity rationed, and risk ra-
tioned and transaction cost rationed. In the operationalization process, first we have
identified SMEs under two categories that have applied for loan and those who have
not. Then we have defined SMEs as constrained and unconstrained borrowers based
on firms’ characteristics in relation to credit market (Boucher et al. 2009). Again, a bor-
rower can be constrained either for supply constraint or demand constraint. Supply
side constrained or quantity rationed occurs if firms face an obligatory credit limit by
FIs. However, if firms do not face a binding credit limit by FIs, it is called demand side
constrained. When firms are not affected by credit limit, these SMEs are the uncon-
strained borrower. The DEM helps to get additional information on the credit market
perceptions toward non-borrowers. This approach can help assess constraint status and
acquire knowledge why some firms are chosen not to borrow even though these firms
believe that they can qualify for a loan (Boucher et al. 2009). The DEM also helps to
identify borrowers who have not applied for loan by asking qualitative questions (Bou-
cher et al. 2009). Based on responses (as we did not find transaction cost rationed bor-
rowers in the survey) we have classified SMEs into four credit rationing categories.
In a credit agreement, collateral is a borrower’s pledge of a property to lenders that
use to secure repayment of the loan. FIs closely monitor the value of an asset held as
collateral and the value of collateral offered by the borrower may affect the credit ra-
tioning behavior of lenders. The availability of collateral can reduce the asymmetric in-
formation between borrowers and lenders (Chan and Kanatas 1985). Collateral can also
solve the problems that arise due to the cost of monitoring of borrowers behavior and
this cost depends on entrepreneur characteristics.
Entrepreneur characteristics like age, gender and education have an impact on credit
constraints. Education can help the entrepreneur to improve skills with the financial
market and prepare a good business plan. Therefore, educated entrepreneurs should
have a low level of credit constraints. A study in Indonesia reveals that the number of
women entrepreneur in SME is relatively low due to mainly low level of education, lack
of training opportunities, and heavy household responsibilities (Tambunan 2011). An-
other study carried out in Nigeria reports that female entrepreneurs are constrained in
credit due to their weak financial position and the lack of collateral. Yet in many coun-
tries, firms face difficulties in the credit market for the biases of entrepreneurs and
characteristics of the firms.
Firm’s characteristics such as firm age and size are the main factors in determining
the credit rationing. In general, firm age is considered as a key indicator of a firm’s
quality since its longevity is an indication of survival ability, quality management and
increased positive image (Diamond 1991). In the credit market, FIs do not prefer young
firms as borrower because information asymmetry between financial institutions and
young firms is more critical as banks do not have enough time to monitor such type of
firms. Moreover, the young firms have relatively less opportunity to build up a good
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relationship with fund suppliers. An empirical study from Dunkelberg (1998) shows
that due to less reputation and credit constraint, the information asymmetries of young
firms are growing. To assess the creditworthiness, young firms are in difficult position
for their poor image and goodwill. In addition, young firms have the high probability to
be the default for high supervision cost and lower collateral values (Boocock and
Woods 1997). Thus, relatively the new and younger firms use fewer FIs’s loan than
older firms (Nichter and Goldmark 2009) due to fear of losing their collateral or they
have enough fund.
In the study, the dependent variable is ‘credit rationing’ and it has four categories: un-
constrained non-borrowers, unconstrained borrowers, quantity rationed borrowers and
risk rationed borrowers. Evidence shows that credit is rationing to SMEs due to entre-
preneur characteristics, firm characteristics and institutional factors. Financial institu-
tions’ credit rationing behaviour theoretically is influenced by different factors such as
age, gender, wealth, experience and credit history, interest rate, firm age, collateral, loan
duration and amount of loan (Okurut et al. 2012). Entrepreneur characteristics include
variables such as the age of the entrepreneur, gender, family size, the number of depen-
dents, education and collateral. Enterprise characteristics include firm age, initial in-
vestment and working place. Lastly, the core concept of the paper has depicted as the
empirical framework (Fig. 1).
SMEs located in Chittagong, some have applied to formal FIs and others did not
apply because of their natures and demands. Firms that applied for a loan, all were not
received the loan from FIs. A few SMEs have received the loan and others were totally
rejected as they did not satisfy the requirements set by the FIs. Again, some SMEs have
received the lower amount than the expected one. Finally, several SMEs were not ap-
plying either for the fear of rejection or losing collateral or they don’t have demand.
Methods
This study is based on Chittagong urban area. Chittagong is the central port and the
commercial and manufacturing center of Bangladesh. In trying to answer the research



































Fig. 1 Empircal framework (based on Gebrekiros 2013)
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Primary data were collected from the study area. A sample of 200 SMEs was selected
for the study. The questionnaire was translated into Bengali. This Bengali version of
the questionnaire was submitted to the entrepreneurs for better understanding and to
get the real insights. The secondary data sources have included the published research
paper, working papers, institutional report, magazines about SMEs and credit about
Bangladesh and developing economies. The data are collected by employing the struc-
tured questionnaire administered by enumerators in association with the researchers
on various socio-economic characteristics of the SMEs and credit rationing of SMEs.
In order to meet the objective of the study, the SMEs were sampled from different
sub-sectors such as service, urban agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. To collect a
representative sample, a stratified and clustered random sampling procedure was
employed. More specifically, the city’s four areas like Agrabad (Commercial Area),
Nasirabad (Industrial Area), Khatungonj and Chaktai (Wholesale Area), and Hali Sha-
hor (Retail and Residential Area) were considered as clusters, with further stratification
within each area using SMEs key characteristics were assessed in the field. The criteria
considered when selecting the area of the study were firm’s economic status (income):
which are high, medium and low income; location and size of the firm (capital and the
number of workers). In stratifying the firms based on income, the convenient proced-
ure used was to select firms based on traditional measurement of wealth: location and
size of the business center. The questionnaire interview was administered from a total
of 200 SMEs sampled from the city of Chittagong and the fieldwork was carried out
during the period from October 04, 2014 to October 14, 2014. Of course before the
final version of the survey, a pre-test survey was conducted in the same city. Respon-
dents older than the age of 18 and who is the owner of the enterprise was chosen for
the interview. Each interview on an average took 20 min. The questionnaire consists of
four sections. Section one covers basic information about entrepreneur characteristics,
section two includes questions dealing with firm characteristics and section three in-
cludes questions dealing with firms’ source of finances, that is, whether they get loan
from formal financial institutions (FIs) or informal institutions. The last section is
about the general question. It deals with the difficulties they faced during loan applica-
tion process.
In trying to answer the research question posed by the study and analyzing the data
with SPSS software, we used descriptive statistics and multinomial logistic regression.
Descriptive statistical tools were used to study SMEs characteristics and their major
Table 1 Shows detail of the response of borrowers and their corresponding category
Responses Constrained category
I have enough money
I don’t have physical project that repaid the loan Unconstrained non-borrowers
I have received the amount that I desired from formal FIs Unconstrained borrowers
I received loan from formal FIs but less than I desired Quantity rationed borrowers
I applied for a loan to formal financial institutions but rejected
I did not want to take risk of my collateral Risk rationed borrowers
I did not apply because I was afraid to manage everything
Formal FIs are strict to sanction loan
Source: Boucher et al. 2009
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source of finance. This analysis is intended to provide some insights into the import-
ance of various characteristics and socio-economic factors related to credit with SMEs
performance and growth. Discussion of the theoretical framework and methodology
has laid a foundation for the discussion of descriptive statistics and empirical analyzes.
The descriptive statistics present the characteristics of SMEs and the major sources of
their financing. These statistics includes mean, standard deviation, minimum, and max-
imum values which were used to compare SMEs and the regression model has been
used to find out the determinants of credit rationing of SMEs.
Results and discussion
Entrepreneurs’ socioeconomic and firms characteristics
Table 2 shows a difference in mean between firms that applied for loan and those didn’t
apply from formal financial institutions. It also shows entrepreneurs’ socio-economic
characteristics. The variables age, education, household size are significant to apply for
the loan from formal financial institutions. In this case, there is no difference between
those entrepreneurs that applied and did not apply for the loan. In our study, the sam-
pled firms comprises various age groups ranging from 23 to 62 years and the average
age of the entrepreneurs is 39-year-old. The average education level (year of schooling)
of the entrepreneurs is 12. The average household size is 6 for joint family structure.
As we can see in (Appendix 1) the discrete variables, out of the total firms applied for
loan from formal financial institutions most are male. There is no significant difference
in gender in terms of applying or not. Most of the applicants are head of household
and this is a significant indicator in terms of applying for loan. Most of the firm owners
are married. Average age of the firms or experience of doing business is 10 years and
the average initial capital of the firms is 0.6 million Bangladeshi Taka where 64 % of the
total firms are working in the rental house (Appendix 1, Table 6).
Application for credit
A total of 200 SMEs were successfully interviewed from the city of Chittagong. As
Table 7 (Appendix 2) shows, out of the total 200 SMEs, 55.5 % applied for the loan
from formal financial institutions within the last three years and 44.5 % did not apply.
This implies that the majority of the firms applied for the loan due to different
reasons. Some of the firms did not want loan. Either they had enough money or
they feared to lose their collateral. Again, the majority (51 %) of the SMEs applied
for the loan from banks and only 4.5 % SMEs applied for the loan from Micro Fi-
nancial Institutions (MFIs).
Table 2 Entrepreneurs socioeconomic characteristics
Applied, N = 111 Not applied, N = 89 Significance of differences Total, N = 200
Characteristics Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev T-value T-value Mean St. Dev
Age 38.90 8.024 39.26 8.79 22.55* 65.79* 38.89 8.36
Education 13.22 3.13 12.64 3.49 24.47* 55.05* 12.96 3.30
HH size 6.43 2.90 7.46 3.06 20.34* 32.11* 6.89 3.01
* 1 % level of significant. Source: Own Survey, 2014
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As Table 8 (Appendix 3) shows out of the total 111 firms that applied for the loan from
formal financial institutions, almost all of them got credit. Firms that applied but were
rejected are few in number. This implies that the majority of the firms that applied for the
loan from formal financial institutions, either from bank or MFIs got the loan. Having said
this, out of the total 96 firms that applied and received, above average of the firms got in
full amount and small number of the firms did not get the full amount. This implies the
highest shares of firms were unconstrained borrowers and not restricted by the credit limit.
As mentioned above out of the total 111 firms that applied for the loan, most of them
received credit from the formal financial institution. Table 9 (Appendix 4) shows that
the higher number of firms applied for the loan for the purpose of their business ex-
pansion, of course, few firms were applied for the purpose of starting new business.
Therefore, the motive of loan for business expansion means that the loan was mainly
used for income generation activities. Most firms financed their business from own sav-
ings, friends or family and banks. A few firms also financed their business from MFIs,
Credit Organizations, and Money Lenders (Table 10, Appendix 5). This implies that
the major source of finance for SMEs are friends and family as many of the small firms
do not have collateral that can be provided for banks and also they do not meet the re-
quirements that are set by banks. In short, the major sources of finance for SMEs in
Chittagong were from formal FIs, mainly banks. The number of firms that were fi-
nanced from their own saving was also large. The share of informal institutions in this
case family or friends, money lenders and credit organization or cooperative society that
financed for SMEs was also huge. This indicates that informal institutions are also greatly
contributing to the development of SMEs and creating employment opportunities.
Distribution of credit constraints
Table 11 (Appendix 6) presents credit rationing status for sampled 200 SMEs. Out of
the total 200 SMEs, 24 % of the SMEs were unconstrained non-borrowers, 28 % of
them unconstrained borrowers, 19 % of them quantity rationed and 29 % of them risk
rationed borrowers. In the study, 29 % of the samples are risk rationed borrower that
reports either firms are rejected from formal FIs or did not apply for the loan, because,
either they have enough money to run their business or the firms were not as such
promising or the firms did not have enough market to pay back the loan or they are
highly risk averse. The unconstrained borrowers mean those firms that applied and re-
ceived the amount they desired. Quantity rationed firms were those firms that applied
for the loan and got less credit than they desired.
As Table 3 below shows trading is the highest share and they engaged mainly in local
wholesalers, retailers, input suppliers and international trade. Out of the total firms that
Table 3 Cross tabulation between sector and credit constraints
Rationed category Trading Manufacturing Services Agricultural Total
Unconstrained borrowers 42 00 11 03 56
Unconstrained Non-borrowers 38 06 02 03 49
Quantity rationed 28 03 06 00 37
Risk rationed 46 04 04 03 57
Total 154 13 23 09 199
Source: Own Survey, 2014
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engaged in trading, most of them were risk rationed borrowers. Service is the second
highest in our sample. The firms classified as services were local beauty parlor, bou-
tique, salon and cybercafé. Here also most of the firms were unconstrained borrowers.
Manufacturing is the third highest in our sample. The firms that are operating in
manufacturing are timber work, metal work, handicrafts, goldsmith, and textile. Still, the
higher share of the manufacturing firms is unconstrained non-borrowers and not found
any unconstrained borrower in this sector. Urban agriculture share is small in comparison
with the other sectors. We sampled only nine firms of urban agriculture since these sec-
tors are not yet expanded and of course it might be categorized as medium and large
scales since it demands huge capital to start. Of the total urban agriculture equal of them
were unconstrained borrowers and non-borrowers and risk rationed borrowers.
In our study, we also assessed credit constrained with firms that had applied for loans
in previous years. As a result 110 firms, they had applied for the loan and 89 firms they
had not applied for the loan in previous years. As Table 12 (Appendix 7) shows out of
the total firms that had applied with formal financial institutions, most of them (57 %)
are risk rationed borrowers. This implies that most of the firm owners are not inter-
ested to receive the loan from credit market for collateral risk and fear of repayment.
The number of firms that had applied in previous years is unconstrained borrowers
which are also high. From the total firms that had not been experienced in previous
years, most of them (49 %) are unconstrained non-borrowers. The share of quantity ra-
tioned borrower is also quite high in number.
Reasons for not applying to formal FIs
As above mentioned of the total firms in our study, 111 of them applied and 89 did not
apply due to different reasons. They answered multiple reasons and majority of the
firms (23.6 %) did not apply for the loan from formal FIs because the interest rate was
high. 18.1 % of the firms also did not apply because of lack of collateral that can pledge
to financial institutions. Some SMEs did not apply due to formal FIs are strict and some
have enough money that can run for their business. Few firms were not also applying due
to high application cost and don’t not have any feasible project (Appendix 8).
Reasons not to give loan by formal FIs
SMEs from different sectors applied to formal FIs but failed to get a loan from different
reasons. In the last three years 111 firms applied but 96 firms received a loan from FIs.
Fifteen SMEs did not receive a loan from FIs and concerned FIs provided the list of
reasons not to sanction the loan to SMEs. Table 16 (Appendix 11) shows that major
(33 %) SMEs could not receive a loan for their risky business. For the lack of the sound
financial statement, FIs did not give the loan to 28 % SMEs. 17 % of SMEs did not get
a loan in the last three years for FIs’ sector biases. Another mentionable ground not to
give loan is the lack of proper collateral (14 %). Few SMEs (8.0 %) are rejected for the
poor repayment history and the lack of personal guarantor.
Sectors need to improve
We asked the owner of SMEs to present some recommendations, based on their expe-
riences, to improve the current credit policy of Formal FIs. 41 % of firm owners
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recommend declining high-interest rate. Second highest, 26 % of SMEs faced problems
in processing their loan application packs. So they urged to reduce the number of re-
quired documentation and the paper works. A major part of total firms (20 %) encoun-
tered the collateral problem and time constraints. So they suggest to be flexible in
collateral and to develop a borrower-friendly repayment procedures. In fine, they (6.0 %
owner of SMEs) recommend to offer and provide the long term loan.
The association between the supply and demand side factors of SME’s credit rationing
To justify the reasons not to sanction loan given by FIs (section 4.5) and the sugges-
tions given by SME owners about the areas that need to be improved by FIs (section
4.6), we asked some personnel of FIs5 in the second phase with a structured question-
naire. In the first phase of data collection, SME owners mentioned several reasons for
not giving loan by formal FIs - lack of sound financial statement, sector biases of FIs,
lack of proper collateral, poor payment history, risks in business, and lack of personal
guarantor. But the FIs do not agree wholly with all these reasons. From their point of
view, some reasons for not giving loan to SMEs may possibly be the lack of proper fi-
nancial statements and collateral, poor repayment history, sector biases and the lack of
personal guarantee. In the year 2008, De la Torre and colleagues carried out a research
on SME financing and they found that FIs dissuade a loan to SME owners for the
opaqueness and informal environment of business, absence of the financial statement,
lack of collateral, and information asymmetry. In the first stage of data collection, we
also asked SME owners to give various suggestions based on their experiences in busi-
ness financing to improve credit policy of FIs that can help SME owners to receive the
loan from formal FIs. In reply, SME owners have recommended declining interest rate,
reducing the number of required paper documents, flexibility in collateral and introdu-
cing a borrower-friendly repayment procedure. Subsequently, FIs also acknowledge
aforesaid borrowers’ recommendations.
Based on the result of cross analysis of supply and demand side of the SME loan con-
straints, through close observations on credit market and face to face interview with
the credit officer of FIs, we found some additional problems regarding credit rationing.
The Major problems for which FIs are less interested in providing SME loans are - less
confidence in SME owners and risk of fund diversion despite central bank’s pressure to
provide more loans to SMEs. The key reason of less confidence in borrowers is because
of hiding information about their purpose. Women entrepreneurs are applying for
SME loan at lower interest rate, but users are male entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the
borrowers do not use the whole amount in pursuing SME business for which the loan
default rate in SME financing is higher than other sectors. It is also the main reason of
not obtaining their desired amount from the FIs that they have applied for. According
to FIs personals, if there is any possibility to divert the fund in unproductive sector, FIs
become conservative in providing borrower’s desired amount. In SME financing, a few
lenders depend on the third party to sell and recover their classified loan. On the con-
trary, some banks are managing credit functions by their own resources. Major FIs are
biased on manufacturing and agricultural business and there are no flat interest rates
and uniform individual bank credit policy on SME financing. The NGOs charged rela-
tively higher (27 %) interest rate that may lead to increase the credit constraints and
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the ultimate result is either rejection or getting lower amount than the desired one. FIs
state that collateral, historical repayments, the market reputation of the clients, and
personal guarantor are more important to obtain the desired amount of loan from FIs.
Regression analysis
Before running a model, in our case the multinomial logit, explanatory variables were
checked for multicollinearity (Verbeek 2008). Multicollinearity is a problem when the
explanatory variables in multiples regression model are highly correlated and provide
irrelevant information about the response. The existence of multicollinearity in the
model may cause large variance, large t-value, and ambiguous results. Two popular
methods to detect the presence of multicollinearity are Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
and Tolerance (TOL). A common rule of thumb is that if VIF is 10 or greater and a
TOL of 0.10 or less may indicate the presence of multicollinearity. So our result is free
from multicollinearity problem (See Appendix 15).
The software SPSS, 20 version is used to estimate the parameter coefficients and pre-
dicted the marginal effect. The direct interpretation of the coefficient estimated from
multinomial logit model is deceptive. Therefore, the marginal effect is used to explain
the determinants of variables on credit rationing. The interpretation of the parameter
estimated from a multinomial logit is explained with respect to the baseline scenario
specified, the output of three different categories can be outlined (Appendix 13). This
means that each of the credit rationing categories can act a base case with the reference
to risk rationed borrowers and allow interpretation of the coefficients in terms of the
base case. The dependent variable, credit rationing has four categories: 1 = uncon-
strained non-borrowers, 2 = unconstrained borrowers, 3 = quantity rationed borrowers
and 4 = risk rationed borrowers (reference case). The result of the marginal effect is
shown in the following Table 4.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the determinants of credit rationing
in small and medium enterprise. To begin with, age category 1 and 2 (1 = 23 to 30 years
and 2 = 31 to 40 years) has a negative significant impact on being quantity rationed bor-
rower. As the age of the younger firm’s owner increases the probability6 (8 % for the
age group 1 and 19 % for the age group-2) of being quantity rationed borrower de-
creases in comparison to the reference group. This implies that financial institutions
like to extend the loan to the middle aged group than the younger. As our data shows,
the average age of the sample is 39 years old, this is believed to be the most economic-
ally active and expecting to make a profit and repay their loan. In the second order,
head of household (category 0 = no) has a positive significant effect on being quantity
rationed borrower. This indicates that firm owners who are not the head of household
have 93 % probability to get the lower amount of credit than expected from Financial
Institutions.
Firm age category 1 (1 to 5 years) has a positive significant effect on being quantity
rationed borrower. This implies that more inexperience in doing business increases the
probability of being quantity rationed borrowers. Firm owners who have 1 to 5 years
experiences in business, 89 % probability support that they will be quantity rationed
borrower. In case of living place, category 1 (own house) has a negative significant im-
pact on being unconstrained borrower and quantity rationed borrowers. Entrepreneurs
Hoque et al. Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research  (2016) 6:1 Page 12 of 23
who are living in their own dwelling place, 77 % probability supports that they will not
be the unconstrained borrower. Anyway, the own house can reduce 20 % probability of
being unconstrained. This implies ownership of house of an entrepreneur can’t be only
guaranteed to be unconstrained borrower; other factors like education, initial invest-
ment, marital status, the number of the employee also influence to be an unconstrained
borrower. Number of employee, category 1 and 2 (1 to 8 in number) has a negative sig-
nificant effect on quantity rationed borrower. As the number of the employee of a firm
increases the probability (9 % for group-1 and 19 % for group-2) of being quantity ra-
tioned borrower decreases. This implies that efficient firms need more employees and
have the better opportunity to earn more. This earning capacity makes them capable to
repay the loan. So, they can receive their desired loan amount from FIs.
In the second last order, we see that workplace category 1 (factory owners) has a
positive significant impact on being unconstrained non-borrower. As the ownership of
workplace increases the probability (75 %) of being unconstrained non-borrower also
increases. This implies that entrepreneur who has own factory or office doesn’t need a
further loan from financial institutions. A possible reason can be that they have enough
money or they don’t have feasible projects to pay back the loan amount. The final stage
shows that the category 1 and the category 2 of the family size have a positive signifi-
cant effect on quantity rationed borrower. As the family size (family member 0 to 7) in-
creases the probability (97 % for category 1 and 95 % for category 2) of being quantity
rationed borrower increases. A possible reason can be on an average those who have
Table 4 Marginal effect estimation after multinomial logit regression
Variables Unconstrained borrowers Unconstrained non-borrowers Quantity rationed borrowers
Age of the Owner 1 = .13 (.801) 1 = .071 (.760) 1 = −2.42 (1.187)**
2 = .15 (.602) 2 = −.09 (.604) 2 = −1.46 (.856)***
3 = −.54 (.768) 3 = −.461 (.757) 3 = .25 (.895)
Gender 0 = .001 (1.002) 0 = 1.09 (.920) 0 = −1.47 (1.193)
Married 0 = −.47 (.905) 0 = .38 (.800) 0 = 1.31 (.978)
Head of HH 0 = .38 (.712) 0 = −.12 (.689) 0 = 2.62 (.949)*
Education 1 = .20 (.556) 1 = −.19 (.542) 1 = −.59 (.730)
2 = .18 (.549) 2 = −.23 (.538) 2 = −.72 (.729)
Firm age 1 = −.58 (.782) 1 = −.73 (.744) 1 = 2.07 (1.180)***
2 = .14 (.699) 2 = −.37 (.670) 2 = 1.47 (1.096)
3 = 1.02 (.776) 3 = .45 (.747) 3 = 1.60 (1.243)
Initial outlay 1 = −.1.11 (.592) 1 = −.32 (.563) 1 = .12 (.713)
2 = .64 (.564) 2 = .27 (.575) 2 = −.33 (.772)
Housing 1 = −1.19 (.499)* 1 = 1.10 (.471) 1 = −1.38 (.638)**
Number of employee 1 = −.77 (.671) 1 = −.21 (.663) 1 = −2.34 (.834)*
2 = .05 (.632) 2 = −.09 (.643) 2 = −1.46 (.773)**
Work Place 1 = .823 (.477) 1 = 1.10 (.471)* 1 = −.52 (.657)
Size of the family 1 = .68 (.800) 1 = −.33 (.777) 1 = 3.58 (1.285)*
2 = 1.23 (.718)* 2 = .10 (.673) 2 = 2.90 (1.146)***
3 = .53 (.774) 3 = .48 (.687) 3 = 1.74 (1.321)
N = 200, Standard error is in parenthesis, * 1 % significant level, ** 5 % significant level, *** 10 % significant level. The
reference category is: risk rationing. Pseudo R2 = 0.432
Source: Own Survey, 2014
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more family members will have higher consumption. The income they get from their
firm may also be allocated for consumption. Through time, the firm will be in eco-
nomic distress and finally they will not receive their desired amount of loan from FIs.
The first point of discussion is related to the data set and strategic sample of the
study. The internal validity is ensured by making use of the formulation of the research
framework and data sources. The DEM clearly defines and categorizes the dependent
variables examined by this study and the supply sides' (FIs) entrepreneurial initiatives
have tradeoff with the recommendations given by the demand side (SME owners).
Moreover, the conservative manner of entrepreneurs to disclose the relevant informa-
tion is another barrier to get the real insights. A second point of discussion is the con-
sideration of the time value of money of initial investment. One who had established
his business 50 years ago with only BDT five thousand initial outlay, needs at least BDT
one million to establish the same venture. So the impact of the initial investment of old
and new firms on credit rationing is irrelevant. The final point of discussion is that the
survey has been made only in the Chittagong city. It may reduce external validity, but
descriptive analysis, the association between the supply and demand side factors of
SME’s credit rationing and statistically significant results can ensure reliability. How-
ever, the study will create an avenue to entrepreneurship development and will contrib-
ute to reducing credit constraints of SMEs in the developing countries like Bangladesh.
Conclusion
This paper examines the determinants of credit rationing of SMEs. A field survey was
conducted and a total of 200 SMEs were randomly selected from the city and inter-
viewed with the structured questionnaire. To answer the research questions posted by
the researchers both descriptive and econometrics method of analyses were used. The
main research questions answered by the researchers are as follows: What are the char-
acteristics of SME owners and SMEs? The average age of firm owners is 39 years of
old, 90 % of the firms are owned by male and 10 % of them by female entrepreneurs,
87 % of the firm’s owners are married and the average years of schooling is 12. On the
other hand, average age of firms is 10 years and the average initial outlay of the firms
are BDT six lacs (0.6 million) where 64 % of total firms are doing their business in the
rental house. What are the major sources of finance? The major sources of finance for
SMEs are friends and family (33 %), 32 % from their own savings, 21.5 % from banks,
5 % from loan organizations, 4 % from MFIs, 2 % from money lenders and 2.5 % from
selling assets. This shows the majority of the SMEs is financed from informal sources;
of course, the share of formal financial institutions is also high.
The third and most important question was the determinants of credit rationing of
SMEs. Out of the sampled 200 SMEs, 111 of them applied for loan and 89 did not
apply for the loan from formal FIs. Descriptive statistics was used to examine the credit
rationing category’s firms. 111 firms applied for the loan, out of total 96 received loan
and 15 of them were rejected. Again, out of the 96 firms 50 received full amount ap-
plied for but 46 of the firms received less than the amount requested. Firms received
lesser amounts than desired for their risky ventures (33 %), lack of sound financial
statement (28 %), business sector bias (17 %) and lack of collateral (14 %). Using DEM,
we also categorize firms based on their response to a qualitative question. So as per
DEM, 25 % of the firms were unconstrained non-borrowers, 28 % unconstrained
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borrowers, 19 % quantity rationed borrowers and 28 % risk rationed borrowers. After
DEM, we employed multinomial logit regression to see the determinants of credit ra-
tion of SMEs. The result shows that education, firm age, marital status, initial outlay,
the number of employees and education do not have any impact on credit rationing.
Age and gender of the owners of the firms, the status of the house, heads of household,
workplace and household size have the impact on credit rationing. From the discussion
in our study, the issues that we raised in terms of policy from the descriptive results
and cross analysis are: interest rate, application cost, the number of paper documents,
rigid rules and regulations, loan disbursement procedure, loan amount and duration,
collateral, financial statement, project feasibility, risk management techniques and irre-
trievable risky business.
Endnotes
1Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
2Evidences show that credit constraints are evolved from the supply side (sources)
and the demand side (SMEs).
3BDT stands for Bangladeshi Taka indicating Bangladeshi currency.
4In our study, we do not have any transaction cost rationed borrower therefore, we
consider four types of credit constrained.
5Banks and NGOs those reject SME owners in sanctioning loan or providing fewer
amounts than they desired.
6Probability = exp(B)/[1 + exp(B)]
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Table 5 Entrepreneurs socioeconomic characteristics of discrete variable
Characteristics Applied for loan, N = 111 Not applied for loan, N = 89 Chi square
Gender Male 99 and female 12 Male 81 and female 8 0.182
House Hold Head (HHH) 110 (72 HHH and 38 non HHH) 88 (14 non HHH, 74 HHH) 8.768a
Marital Status 111 (18 non married, 93 married) 89 (9 non married, 80 married) 2.48
a 5 % level of significant, Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 6 Characteristics of the firms
Particulars Frequency Mean/Percentage Std. deviation/Percentage
Age of the firms 200 9.85 6.89
Initial outlay of the firm 198 597,111.111 601224.67
Status of work place 200 36 % own 64 % rented
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 7 Firms applied for loan
Loan received formal Frequency Percentage Cumulative
No 89 44.5 44.5
Yes 111 55.5 100
Total 200 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014





Table 8 Firms applied for loan and received
Loan received formal Frequency Percentage Cumulative
No 15 13.5 13.5
Yes 96 86.5 100
Total 111 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 9 Purpose of the loan
Purpose of the loan Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Expansion 80 72.7 72.7
Start of business 30 27.3 100
Total 110 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 10 Source of finance
Sources of finance Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Bank 78 21.5 21.5
MFIs 14 3.9 25.4
Money Lender 8 2.2 27.6
Own saving 115 31.8 59.4
Friends/Family 121 33.4 92.8
Credit Organisation 18 5.0 97.8
Others 8 2.2 100
Total 362 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 11 Distribution of credit constrained
Credit rationed category Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Unconstrained borrowers 56 28.1 28.1
Unconstrained non-borrowers 49 24.6 52.8
Quantity rationing 37 18.6 71.4
Risk rationing 57 28.6 100
Total 199 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014




Table 12 Cross tabulation between credit constraints with experience
Ration category Experience (Firms applied in previous years)
No Yes Total
Unconstrained borrowers 01 55 56
Unconstrained Non-borrowers 48 01 49
Quantity rationed 00 37 37
Risk rationed 40 17 57
Total 89 110 199
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 13 Frequencies not to apply to formal FIs
Why not apply formal institutions Frequency (Responses, N = 87) Percentage Cumulative
Loan was not needed 29 14.6 14.6
Have enough money 18 9.0 23.6
Don’t want risk collateral 36 18.1 41.7
Formal institution too strict 34 17.1 58.8
Interest rate is high 47 23.6 82.4
High application cost 12 6 88.4
No feasible project 04 2 90.4
Fear of repayment 16 8 98.4
Other reasons 03 1.5 100
Total 199 times 100
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 14 Reasons not to give loan from formal FIs
Responses
Reasons not to give loan N Percent
Lack of Collateral 13 13.8 %
Lack of sound financial statement 26 27.7 %
Poor repayment history 1 1.1 %
Sector Bias 16 17.0 %
Risky Venture 31 33.0 %
Other reasons 7 7.4 %
Total 94 100 %
Source: Own Survey, 2014




Table 15 Firms recommendation to FIs
Frequencies of Firms recommendations to FIs
Responses Percent
of casesN Percent
Recommendation to FIsa Collateral 90 20.3 % 45.5 %
Interest rate 183 41.2 % 92.4 %
loan duration 27 6.1 % 13.6 %
repayment 27 6.1 % 13.6 %
application 115 25.9 % 58.1 %
others 2 0.5 % 1.0 %
Total 444 100.0 % 224.2 %
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 16 Applied and received from formal FIs
Applied and received from formal FIs * Which formal FIs applied Cross tabulation
Count
which formal FIs applied Total
Banks MFIs
applied and received from formal FIs no 40 1 41
yes 61 8 69
Total 101 9 110
Source: Own Survey, 2014
Table 17 Desired amount received from FIs
received desired amount from formal FIs
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid no 46 23.0 47.9 47.9
yes 50 25.0 52.1 100.0
Total 96 48.0 100.0
Missing System 104 52.0
Total 200 100.0
Source: Own Survey, 2014
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Appendix 13
Table 18 Case process summary of multinomial logit analysis
Case processing summary
N Marginal percentage
What is the distribution of credit constraints? unconstrained borrowers 55 27.9 %
unconstrained non-borrowers 49 24.9 %
quantity rationing 37 18.8 %
risk rationing 56 28.4 %
age of the entrepreneur 23 to 30 39 19.8 %
31 to 40 85 43.1 %
41 to 45 30 15.2 %
46 to 62 43 21.8 %
gender of the entrepreneur female 20 10.2 %
male 177 89.8 %
marital status non married 27 13.7 %
married 170 86.3 %
nr. of year of schooling 1 to 10 54 27.4 %
11 to 12 57 28.9 %
13 to 16 86 43.7 %
head of household no 52 26.4 %
yes 145 73.6 %
nr. of household member 0 to 4 52 26.4 %
5 to 7 67 34.0 %
8 to 10 53 26.9 %
11 to 15 25 12.7 %
age of the firm 1 to 5 58 29.4 %
6 to 10 70 35.5 %
11 to 15 40 20.3 %
16 to 50 29 14.7 %
initial outlay of the firm 5000 to 200000 63 32.0 %
200001 to 600000 74 37.6 %
600001 to 3100000 60 30.5 %
number of employee 1 to 4 81 41.1 %
5 to 8 64 32.5 %
9 and above 52 26.4 %
status of work place own 72 36.5 %
rented 125 63.5 %
place live in own 131 66.5 %
Rented 66 33.5 %




a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 190 (99.0 %) subpopulations
Source: Own Survey, 2014
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Appendix 14
Table 19 Parameter Estimates (Multinomial Logit Analysis)
Parameter estimates










unconstrained borrowers Intercept -.084 1.085 .006 1 .938
[age = 1] .131 .801 .027 1 .870 1.140 .237 5.478
[age = 2] .155 .602 .066 1 .797 1.167 .359 3.796
[age = 3] -.543 .768 .500 1 .480 .581 .129 2.618
[age = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[gender = 0] .001 1.002 .000 1 .999 1.001 .140 7.133
[gender = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[marriage = 0] -.472 .905 .272 1 .602 .624 .106 3.673
[marriage = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[education = 1] .205 .556 .136 1 .712 1.228 .413 3.654
[education = 2] .186 .549 .115 1 .735 1.205 .411 3.534
[education = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[headofhh = 0] .380 .712 .286 1 .593 1.463 .363 5.904
[headofhh = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[sizeoffamily = 1] .683 .800 .728 1 .394 1.979 .412 9.501
[sizeoffamily = 2] 1.231 .718 2.938 1 .087 3.424 .838 13.990
[sizeoffamily = 3] .536 .774 .479 1 .489 1.709 .375 7.795
[sizeoffamily = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[ageoffirm = 1] -.585 .782 .558 1 .455 .557 .120 2.582
[ageoffirm = 2] .140 .699 .040 1 .841 1.150 .292 4.524
[ageoffirm = 3] 1.024 .776 1.741 1 .187 2.783 .608 12.731
[ageoffirm = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[initialinv = 1] −1.114 .592 3.545 1 .060 .328 .103 1.047
[initialinv = 2] .644 .564 1.306 1 .253 1.904 .631 5.750
[initialinv = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[nr.ofemployee
= 1]
-.773 .671 1.329 1 .249 .462 .124 1.718
[nr.ofemployee
= 2]
.056 .632 .008 1 .929 1.058 .306 3.652
[nr.ofemployee
= 3]
0b . . 0 . . . .
[workplace = 1] .823 .477 2.973 1 .085 2.277 .894 5.802
[workplace = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[living = 1] −1.199 .499 5.766 1 .016 .302 .113 .802
[living = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
unconstrained non-
borrowers
Intercept .330 .996 .110 1 .740
[age = 1] .071 .760 .009 1 .926 1.073 .242 4.762
[age = 2] -.092 .604 .023 1 .879 .912 .279 2.980
[age = 3] -.461 .757 .370 1 .543 .631 .143 2.783
[age = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
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Table 19 Parameter Estimates (Multinomial Logit Analysis) (Continued)
[gender = 0] 1.090 .920 1.404 1 .236 2.974 .490 18.039
[gender = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[marriage = 0] .380 .800 .225 1 .635 1.462 .305 7.014
[marriage = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[education = 1] -.194 .542 .128 1 .721 .824 .285 2.384
[education = 2] -.237 .538 .195 1 .659 .789 .275 2.262
[education = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[headofhh = 0] -.122 .689 .031 1 .860 .886 .230 3.415
[headofhh = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[sizeoffamily = 1] -.335 .777 .186 1 .666 .715 .156 3.281
[sizeoffamily = 2] .102 .673 .023 1 .879 1.108 .296 4.142
[sizeoffamily = 3] .484 .687 .496 1 .481 1.623 .422 6.238
[sizeoffamily = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[ageoffirm = 1] -.734 .744 .972 1 .324 .480 .112 2.064
[ageoffirm = 2] -.377 .670 .317 1 .573 .686 .184 2.550
[ageoffirm = 3] .456 .747 .373 1 .541 1.578 .365 6.818
[ageoffirm = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[initialinv = 1] -.320 .563 .323 1 .570 .726 .241 2.189
[initialinv = 2] .271 .575 .222 1 .638 1.311 .425 4.046
[initialinv = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[nr.ofemployee
= 1]
−.211 .663 .101 1 .750 .810 .221 2.967
[nr.ofemployee
= 2]
−.091 .643 .020 1 .887 .913 .259 3.217
[nr.ofemployee
= 3]
0b . . 0 . . . .
[workplace = 1] 1.105 .471 5.520 1 .019 3.021 1.201 7.596
[workplace = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[living = 1] −.633 .513 1.525 1 .217 .531 .194 1.450
[living = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
quantity rationing Intercept −1.755 1.628 1.162 1 .281
[age = 1] −2.429 1.187 4.190 1 .041 .088 .009 .902
[age = 2] −1.463 .856 2.917 1 .088 .232 .043 1.241
[age = 3] .251 .895 .079 1 .779 1.286 .223 7.427
[age = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[gender = 0] −1.472 1.193 1.521 1 .217 .230 .022 2.379
[gender = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[marriage = 0] 1.318 .978 1.814 1 .178 3.735 .549 25.420
[marriage = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[education = 1] −.591 .730 .656 1 .418 .554 .132 2.316
[education = 2] −.722 .729 .981 1 .322 .486 .116 2.028
[education = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[headofhh = 0] 2.625 .949 7.645 1 .006 13.801 2.147 88.708
[headofhh = 1] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[sizeoffamily = 1] 3.582 1.285 7.767 1 .005 35.950 2.895 446.446
[sizeoffamily = 2] 2.909 1.146 6.440 1 .011 18.339 1.939 173.448
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Table 19 Parameter Estimates (Multinomial Logit Analysis) (Continued)
[sizeoffamily = 3] 1.740 1.321 1.737 1 .188 5.700 .428 75.870
[sizeoffamily = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[ageoffirm = 1] 2.078 1.180 3.103 1 .078 7.990 .791 80.677
[ageoffirm = 2] 1.476 1.096 1.813 1 .178 4.373 .511 37.461
[ageoffirm = 3] 1.604 1.243 1.666 1 .197 4.974 .435 56.816
[ageoffirm = 4] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[initialinv = 1] .120 .713 .028 1 .867 1.127 .279 4.562
[initialinv = 2] −.331 .772 .184 1 .668 .718 .158 3.260
[initialinv = 3] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[nr.ofemployee
= 1]
−2.348 .834 7.923 1 .005 .096 .019 .490
[nr.ofemployee
= 2]
−1.464 .773 3.591 1 .058 .231 .051 1.051
[nr.ofemployee
= 3]
0b . . 0 . . . .
[workplace = 1] −.520 .657 .626 1 .429 .595 .164 2.156
[workplace = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
[living = 1] −1.382 .638 4.701 1 .030 .251 .072 .876
[living = 2] 0b . . 0 . . . .
a. The reference category is: risk rationing
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant
Source: Own Survey, 2014




Standardized coefficients t Sig. Collinearity
statistics
B Std. error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 2.697 .672 4.012 .000
age of the entrepreneure .037 .093 .033 .400 .690 .727 1.376
gender of the entrepreneure .244 .335 .063 .728 .467 .651 1.535
marital status −.188 .289 −.055 −.652 .515 .679 1.473
nr. of year of schooling .035 .105 .024 .330 .742 .888 1.126
head of household .054 .251 .020 .215 .830 .547 1.830
nr. of household member .026 .089 .022 .293 .770 .868 1.153
age of the firm −.188 .091 −.164 −2.067 .040 .776 1.288
initial outlay of the firm −.188 .108 −.127 −1.744 .083 .919 1.088
number of employee −.011 .113 −.008 −.101 .920 .806 1.240
status of work place .488 .180 .200 2.710 .007 .890 1.124
place live in −.396 .182 −.159 −2.177 .031 .908 1.102
a. Dependent Variable: What is the distribution of credit constraints?
Source: Own Survey, 2014
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